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22 December 1978

MEMORANDUM	FOR	THE	RECORD

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SUBJECT: Exchange with HSCA Representatives at a Meeting and I had Sunday Morning with Messrs. Blakey & Cornwell

- 1. There were a number of fairly wide-ranging exchanges. Our relationship has been characterized in the past by the absence of such exchanges, and Blakey's readiness to do so now is interesting, although whether it ends up being meaningful is not yet clear. As these exchanges were general, rather than being tied to the draft report which we were discussing, I believe that our agreement to have no record of exchanges concerning these draft reports does not apply to these broader discussions.
- 2. Mr. Blakey asked what we believe to be CIA's main contributions to the Warren Commission investigation. I gave him two general statements, prefaced with the comment that CIA was necessarily limited because of the nature of the subject matter. They are discussed below.
 - (A) There is an area of intelligence that we refer to as "indications intelligence," which refers to indications of possible hostile action or major international initiatives on the part of the opposition. In this general field we refer loosely to something that we call "negative indications."
 - (1) As a result of the first world-wide alert following the assassination of President Kennedy there was extensive reporting from around the world on the Cuban and Soviet official communities.

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Not only did this reflect no advance knowledge on the part of those people, which one would expect, but it reflected no instructions after the assassination that one might have expected if the assassination had been sponsored by the Cubans and Soviets and some resulting initiative was to be undertaken. While these negative indications are not conclusive they cannot be dismissed; added to other considerations they have some positive weight.

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It is our belief that the DGI is essentially run by the Soviets. It would not undertake such an action without Soviet approval. One should consider that while major powers may feel free to intervene in the affairs of minor powers, they are unlikely to take the same liberties with other major powers. The Soviets did not want another October 1962 crisis and the rationale of caution in this respect should be given full weight.

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These considerations, based on Agency records and knowledge, were important factors that should be considered by anyone addressing the question of foreign conspiracy.

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(2) Other than the reconstruction of Oswald's travel in connection with his residence in the USSR, CIA's main contribution in the foreign jurisdiction was the Mexico reporting. A central issue as to what Oswald did in Mexico City was his contact with the Cubans and Soviets. CIA issued a pro forma report on the Soviet contact in October 1962 and had in its files information that made it possible to speak later with considerable confidence on his other contacts with both the Cuban and Soviet installations. This was hard evidence of the contact and CIA was responsible for it.

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about Cuban operations (the inadequacies of our low-level	25 X 1
for which no record exists of tasking by Headquarters on the Oswald investigation, although there is considerable evidence of extensive activity in this respect as reflected in the 1977 Task Force Report.	25 X 1
4. Some of the discussion appeared to present new considerations to Mr. Blakey and there were some follow-up requests which are being handled in the normal manner. He told us, during the meeting, of the new four-shot evidence before the Committee, so the general observations may have more pertinence than otherwise might be the case.	25X1 25X1
S. D. Breckinridge	25X1